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INTRODUCTION 
 
The French civil service is a complex institution to interpret as its historical 
development displays different ordering patterns with somehow contradictory orientations. 
The global image is well known: it is a unified merit and career based civil service system, 
traditionally associated with the idea of a strong state tradition (État is always capitalised) and 
the concept of service public encompassing an extensive number of public activities (from 
sovereign functions to industrial and commercial public services). Its legitimacy is rooted in 
the dominant values defining the “service of the state”. They emphasize the idea of a 
disinterested civil servant serving the general interest and guarding the public good while also 
promoting the principles of impartiality, equality, adaptability and continuity. The robustness 
of the French civil service confronted to reforms has also been stressed.  
More in-depth descriptions suggest a blurred picture mixing contradictory trends. The 
integrated statutory law, established in 1946 and regulating the rights and duties of all civil 
servants and the protection of citizen‟s rights towards public authorities, coexists with a 
highly fragmented structure corresponding to the large number of “corps” (about 1500 in 
2000), the many groupings of public agents managed under similar conditions of recruitment, 
training, careers, promotions and pay. The various forms of self-management developed 
within the corps (exemplarily within the grands corps) contrasts with the idea of a legally 
unified civil service conforming to a uniform pattern throughout the country under the 
supervision of the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat), the highest administrative court. The 
typical career system has been distorted by the distinction between the rank (individually 
assigned to the civil servant according to its recruitment within a corps, grade) and the 
position (the role fulfilled, emploi) that introduces some flexibility and some elements of a 
job-based civil service: it allows promotion within the corps without job vacancy, transfer of 
job without loss of rank but also political appointments at senior positions and a privileged 
path to political career for higher civil servants who will occupy political positions without 
loosing their rank and belonging to the administration. In the same vein, the celebration of the 
general interest and the principle of neutrality is in sharp contrast to the high level of 
politicization for the top civil servants. At last, historical and current trends of development 
and transformations reflect more changes and low profile evolutions than usually recognized.  
These distinct features of the French civil service can be partly explained by the 
successive regimes France has experienced (Monarchist, Bonapartist, republican, 
authoritarian and pro-German in occupied France for Vichy, parliamentary, semi-
presidential). The successive ruling elites were always suspicious of the inherited 
administration and the repeated attempts to consolidate the regimes led to complex dynamics 
of professionalization and reinforced autonomy (to rationalize administrative capacities to 
rule) together with politicization (to reward or to obtain loyalty, specifically at the top). After 
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two centuries, the civil service did exist as an autonomous institution, differentiated around its 
specific administrative law but also highly fragmented through its division in corps and 
ministries. With the constitution of the Fifth Republic since 1958, the position and social 
prestige of senior civil servants became even stronger as a result of the success of the Gaullist 
political elites for whom top bureaucrats acted as a “relaying elite” (Quermonne 1982, p. 340-
346). They were strongly involved in developing new reforms and became closely identified 
with the new political elites who relied on them. Many senior officials then became 
committed to a regime that gave them new opportunities to enhance their careers. This 
structural arrangement giving strong power and high social prestige to top bureaucrats from 
the grands corps through discrete mechanisms of politicization was to be institutionalised in 
the following decades.  
Although resilient in its inherited features, the French civil service has not remained 
unaffected by the neo-managerial trends and the changing political and economic context 
characterized by European pressures, trends towards decentralization, market-oriented 
policies, social transformations and new forms of political leadership. While the evolutions of 
the 1980s and 1990s appeared quite gradual and smooth, the new presidency of Nicolas 
Sarkozy has made public unusually sharp public critics against the French historical model. In 
his first major discourse on state reform on September 19
th
, 2007, President Sarkozy drew 
several systematic and radical trends for reform: the abolition of the corps system, the 
development of a job-based civil service, strong emphasis on mobility within the 
administrative system and between the three branches of the civil service (state, local 
authorities, hospitals), financial incentives to leave the civil service, possibility for the new 
recruit, but only for specific jobs in the French bureaucracy, to choose between acquiring the 
statute of „civil agent‟ (with its pre-fixed rights, obligations and rewards) or preferring a 
private law contract he can negotiate by mutual agreement with possibly better wage 
conditions in exchange for the loss of a career-based appointment and a security of tenure. 
From October 2007 to March 2008, a major conference on the values, missions and 
occupations of the future French civil service took place. Bringing together experts, civil 
service trade unions, ministries and representatives of the Ministry for Budgeting, Public 
Accounts and the Civil Service, the conference produced a „white paper‟ on the future of the 
French civil service (Silicani 2008) aimed at framing the possible reforms and at giving 
legitimacy to the new political goals. Although not systematically adopted yet but already 
implemented along several lines (mobility, intense movement of mergers of corps), this global 
program could significantly transform, if accomplished, the historical pattern of the French 
civil service.  
In this chapter, four issues are examined. The first section is devoted to the historical 
development of the French civil service. The second section focuses on the various 
dimensions of the internal labour market while the third one addresses the issue of 
politicization. The fourth section analyses the recent transformations at stake and the way they 
potentially challenge the existing features of the French civil service system. The conclusion 
draws some perspectives of evolution due to these changes.  
 
The Development and Transformations of the French Civil Service System: 
Historical Trends 
 
Origins: The Ancien Régime and the set-up of central administrative capacities
1
 
                                                 
1
 Most of the text of this sub-part is taken up from the initial chapter on France by Marie-Christine Meininger 
(2001) in the book edited by A. J. G. M. Bekke and Frits van der Meer. We thank her for authorizing us to use 
her analysis of this first period.  
 3 
 
The development of the French civil service developed together with the emergence 
and growth of the modern state. During the Ancien Régime, the centralisation process steered 
by the monarchy led to the creation and reinforcement of administrative organizations in order 
to overcome rival powers (nobility, intermediate bodies, local powers, etc.). The power of the 
absolute monarch relied on the development of its administration (Legendre 1992 ; Boscher 
1970; Mousnier 1974; for overview, Rouban 1988; Burdeau 1989; Thomas 1995; 
Dreyfus 2000). The establishment of a permanent professionalised army and the distinction 
between the King‟s property and public property were the first expressions of this evolution 
from a personalised to a statist rule. Several administrative positions and functions were 
gradually created, reflecting both the various attempts of the monarch to extend its steering 
capacities and the complexity of the Ancien Régime society as illustrated by the social status 
granted to the employees of these new administrative bodies and by their different forms of 
autonomy and dependence from the King. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the 
French civil service was far from being as homogeneous as the Prussian administration. Three 
groups can be distinguished:  
- officers, having inherited their charge, responsible for justice and finances issues and, 
for a few of them, forming a first group of top civil servants from the nobility (the corps des 
maîtres des requêtes) ;  
- public servants commissioned for a specific task (commissaires) who could be 
dismissed at the discretion of the monarch: in this group, we find state councillors and 
officials representing the king in the provinces (governors, intendants
2
) or abroad 
(ambassadors) ;  
- a third category, called „commis‟ or „employés‟ (clerks), which prefigures the 
modern civil service as staffs of the emerging ministerial bureaux. Being appointed, they 
received a salary and some kind of allowance, and were able to enjoy a retirement pension. 
Nevertheless, their recruitment and career were subject to patronage and favouritism.  
 
This diversity resulted in conflicts and divisions, especially between the nobility, holding their 
charges from inheritance, and those who represented the monarch as public agents (of 
common birth). The increase in the number of hereditary posts led to the reinforcement of 
patrimonial mechanisms over which the monarch exercised no control. However, the 
administration facilitated the reinforcement of the monarchy, enmeshing the activities of 
society within codes and rules and acting as a mediator between the monolithic activity of the 
monarch and a stratified and corporatist society. 
 
During the eighteenth century, features of a professionalised bureaucracy emerged for two 
major reasons (Meininger 2001). The first was the development of technical functions such as 
public works and roads: the most striking example was the creation of a specific corps of civil 
engineers (1716) and of a dedicated school in 1747 (Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées), the first 
school of administration. It illustrates the emergence of a technical role for the state, which 
acts more frequently like an entrepreneur, creating the infrastructure for economic activities. 
The second reason was the growing importance of offices (bureaux) in preparing the 
decisions taken by the secretaries of state or the general controller of finance, especially at the 
                                                 
2
 During the Ancien Régime, collecting taxes was not a task of the monarch administration but was entrusted to 
the members of a corporation called Fermiers généraux. 
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end of the Ancien Régime, as a consequence of ministerial instability and centralisation. 
However, despite some attempts to abolish the transmission of charges by inheritance or to 
reduce the role of private interests, this system was not significantly altered before the 
revolution.  
 
 
The emergence of professionalised rules: the revolution and the Napoleonic period 
 
The revolution first brought the abolition of privileges, amongst which the property of 
charges, and established new principles such as the principle of equal access to public offices 
and charges, without any other distinction than those resulting from talents (Declaration of 
Human Rights Art. 6). During the revolution, the composition of the civil service was altered. 
The nobles disappeared and representatives of the middle class entered the service. Another 
major consequence of the revolutionary period, following the reinforcement of the executive 
power, was the explosion of staffs in ministerial bureaux. The creation of new ministries 
(Justice, War, Foreign Affairs, Navy) and the war led to the appointment of many public 
employees whose number increased from 600 in 1789 to 7000 in 1799 (Church 1981) but 
one-third of recruited ministerial officials, at the end of the Directoire (1799), had previously 
served under the Ancien Régime, particularly in the financial administration (ibid.). However, 
this growth, in a revolutionary context where the legislative power and the general will were 
celebrated, led to a distrust towards the bureaucracy as a dangerous force, due to its 
potentially excessive autonomy and to its fiscal cost (Rosanvallon 1990, p. 49-74). According 
to Rosanvallon, this produced a “cultural” or a structurally engrained difficulty to address the 
complexity of the relationship between the government and the bureaucracy and to think the 
conditions and limits of its autonomy. The civil servant (fonctionnaire) was viewed as an 
agent of the executive government and mechanisms of politicization were then justified as 
techniques of control.  
As argued by Tocqueville, the Napoleonic period largely built upon the foundations 
laid by the Ancien Régime and reinforced the centralized structures of the state. 
Bernard S. Silberman nicely summed up the issue to be solved: „how to integrate the highly 
fractionated structure of local elites/notables into a community with national interests as well 
as local ones‟ (Silberman 1993, p. 104). The Napoleonic solution consisted in the creation of 
a rationalized administrative organisation (départements), of the prefects and sub-prefects (the 
central government‟s appointees and representatives on all matters) and of the mayors, 
initially appointed by central governments or prefects. This structure was the basis for 
developing mechanisms of central steering, resting on an (idealised) uniform and hierarchical 
administrative model, with the prefects as its cornerstone (Wright 1992 ; Hayward, Wright 
2002). At this time, the civil service hardly began its professionalization, constrained by 
different contradictory dynamics. Several typical French features structuring the civil service 
originated in this context.  
The first is the existence of an autonomous corpus of administrative law 
(Cassese 2000), distinct from the common law, that was to become the law of the executive 
power, the administration and the civil service, structuring its organization and its 
relationships to citizens. It was decided that ordinary courts were not in charge of 
administrative conflicts within administrations or with the citizens. Initially designed in 1799 
to advise the government and to draft bills, the Conseil d’Etat served as a “disciplinary organ” 
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for state public agents and as a Supreme administrative court to solve administrative conflicts 
between ministries or opposing the administration and the French citizens. Civil servants, 
distinct from clerks, were then protected from being prosecuted or sued for facts related to 
their public activities („guarantee for civil servants”). The second Napoleonic contribution 
was the first steps towards an „organizational oriented civil service‟ (Silberman 1993, p. 10) 
based on a mix of i) early commitment in a bureaucratic role and career during the 
educational process ; ii) organizational boundaries that structure early commitments (specific 
courses of university training such as law or „public‟ sciences in order to become a public 
servant, specific schools designed to train top civil servants and/or forms of apprenticeship 
program before being appointed) and iii) strong career predictability through an integrated 
internal labour market channelled by departments or controlling bodies and reinforced by a 
system of ministerial corps. These elements were designed, although gradually implemented, 
during the Napoleonic period (Silberman 1993 p. 108-119). Admittedly, Napoleon did not 
create the French grandes écoles (Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées, 1747; Ecole des Mines, 
1793; Ecole centrale des travaux publics which was to become the Ecole Polytechnique, 
1794 ; Ecole normale supérieure, 1874-95). However, Napoleon re-established them as 
training schools for various bodies of civil servants (engineers, teachers, lawyers, and the 
like). For instance, Napoleon created the position of trainee (auditeur) in the Council of State 
in 1803 to assist the Councillors, and trained young people to occupy administrative (prefects) 
and diplomatic careers. Similarly, his policy from the lycée and the baccalauréat to 
universities and grandes écoles
 
was aimed at giving the state the monopoly and control over 
education based on merit (knowledge acquisition). These institutions were created to channel 
the entry to the civil service and to provide individual professional training and skills as main 
criterion for holding higher administrative offices. Forms of job stability appeared in the civil 
service.  
However, strong mechanisms of politicization were also set up or extended from the 
previous period. Apart from the general principle of specific rules of law for the 
administration and its civil servants, no specific rules for recruitment, career, rights and duties 
for civil servants were established during the Napoleonic period (Dreyfus 2000, p. 118-120). 
This contrasted with the strength of discretionary appointments for top positions and the 
growing importance of favouritism and patronage at lower levels for employees and, to a 
lesser extent, for middle rank civil servants. Personal choices of prefects by Napoleon, 
executive nominations in the „grands corps‟ (Conseil d’Etat or the Cour des Comptes) and the 
extensive use of ministerial entourages were the complementary structures of the emergence 
of an organizational orientation. Two dimensions have then been initiated in the Napoleonic 
context which were to remain “typical” of the French configuration: a dynamics of 
bureaucratization based on training schools and emerging requirements to enter the civil 
service and a dynamics of politicization.  
 
Civil Service Reforms Under Pressures for Politicization (1815-1940) 
 Put in a nutshell, the Nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century with 
its numerous successive political regimes (Restauration, revolutions of 1830 and 1848, July 
Monarchy, Second Empire, Third Republic) stood as a long period of reiterated games 
opposing defenders of bureaucratic autonomy and professionalism on the one hand, and, on 
the other, parliamentary and party political groups maintaining forms of patronage, 
favouritism and politicization. Forms of politicization achieved a high degree under the July 
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Monarchy when membership in the Chamber of Deputies was combined with being a civil 
servant (députés-fonctionnaires): this phenomenon resulted from the strategy of the executive, 
appointing deputies in administrative positions as a reward and favouring the election of civil 
servants in Parliament as a way to control them. At the same time and although initially 
modest in staff numbers, political entourage or ministerial cabinets grew: especially under 
Napoleon III when members of the Conseil d’Etat (Council of State) held positions but also 
under the Third republic when the aim of converting public agents to the Republican ideology 
was crucial and when ministerial cabinets began to facilitate the departures of top bureaucrats 
(from technical corps or the Inspection des Finances) to private firms. Personal relations and 
social criteria continued to prevail in appointments, which remained at the discretion of the 
head of the state or of the ministers. Above all, under the Third Republic, there were 
Republican parliamentary politicians belonging to the middle-class bourgeoisie or the 
professions (Charle 1991, p. 256-261) who increased their use of the Chamber of Deputies to 
gain control over and to colonize specific ministries (Interior, Ponts et Chaussées, Education) 
with state field administration. At this time, politicians in Parliament considered themselves 
as opponents to the state and to the higher social classes who were identified to it and who 
managed to control the access to the top administrative positions (Shefter 1994, p. 57). 
Indeed, upper classes families controlled the access to the senior civil service and a certain 
income was necessary to apply for the grands corps (Charle 1991, p. 261-267). Members of 
the aristocracy were recruited in the prefectoral and diplomatic career while only engineering 
schools were initially open to members of the middle-classes with recruitment by competitive 
exams, early established for technical corps (Meininger 2001).  
More generally, gradual moves towards bureaucratization and professionalization of 
the civil service repeatedly took place. Somehow paradoxically, the „grands corps‟ (especially 
the Conseil d’Etat, the Inspection des Finances and the Cour des Comptes), with the most 
socially elitist recruitment, appeared to be the first administrative organizations to be 
professionalized and bureaucratized as Republic ministerial politicians found interest in 
having reliable, competent and autonomous overhead institutions at centre level (Dreyfus 
2000, p. 175-178). Competitive exams were set up respectively in 1872, 1879 and 1886 for 
the three administrative „grands corps‟. Foreign, colonial and military administrations also 
benefited from more selective recruitment and legal protection through the creation of a 
statute (1834 for the corps of Foreign Affairs; 1834 for military officers as described by 
Saglio 2005). The distinction between rank and position, a specific French feature for the civil 
service, was adopted at this period. However, competitive exams and rationalised system of 
promotion were only slowly introduced for middle-rank bureaucrats, street-level public agents 
and specifically “clerks” for whom political allegiance remained crucial, even during the 
Third Republic. Several other efforts towards rationalization were gradually developed on 
different issues (Meininger 2001): the emergence of a hierarchical structure within ministries, 
the development of regulations on salaries and working hours, the organisation of careers and 
promotions (the career predictability being the motivation for entering the civil service), the 
set up of unified disciplinary rules for civil servants and the institutionalization of these 
elements as “rights” (to receive a salary, to be promoted, to get a pension when they retire). 
However, this dynamics of professionalization had to mesh with the many groups of civil 
servants who based their recruitment and careers on political allegiances. The creation of a 
national school of administration in 1848 was immediately abolished in 1849 and claims for 
having done with favouritism remained strong during the Third Republic. Silberman‟s 
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argument is here convincing. In France, while mechanisms of career and autonomy were set 
up, post-revolutionary monarchs, emperors and republican governments were reluctant and 
unwilling to create a fully autonomous civil service because of the political instability. Thus, 
the political uncertainty due to the frequency of leaders‟ turnover and the instability of 
regimes led to the building of a twofold dynamics: accepting and developing early 
bureaucratic forms of recruitment through training schools, concours and career „to produce a 
pool of eligibles who could meet the standard of expertise‟ (Silberman 1993, p. 137) and, at 
the same time, among these already selected elites, maintaining modes of political choices and 
loyalty. During the Third Republic, however, three factors prepared the foundation for the 
establishment of a professional civil service. First were the reactions against patronage and 
discretionary power by the growingly influential associations of civil servants (anticipated 
forms of trade unions) and asking for regulation of careers and disciplinary procedures.  
Second, the value of professional competence gained considerable credit in the 1920s and 
1930s in accordance with the anti-parliamentarism that prevailed in the civil service and with 
the increasing influence of organizational doctrines for reforming the administration. Third, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the jurisprudence of the Council of State played an 
important role in establishing principles such as the civil servant‟s right to review his personal 
file in case of a disciplinary procedure, or rules regarding the regularity of promotions 
(Meininger 2001).  
During the all period, however, the French civil service remained highly fragmented 
due to its segmentation in multiple corps - cross-ministerial groupings of officials with the 
same conditions of service and their own particular methods of internal management and 
promotion - and the strength of the growing ministerial specialization revealing a highly 
Balkanized administration.  
 
Decisive Moves Towards the Professionalization of the French Civil Service on an 
Integrated Basis (1940-1980s) 
 
 The troubled period of the Vichy regime (1940-1944) blurred the dynamics of 
evolution. Dominantly characterized by reactionary decisions such as the abolition of civil 
service trade unions and by antisemitic, xenophobic and political purges within the civil 
service, the authoritarian regime also strengthened the idea of obedience to the state and even 
set up the first statute for civil servants as a strategic mean to obtain political loyalty (Baruch 
1997, 2000).  
The creation of the Fourth Republic gave a new and larger base of support for a 
professionalized and more autonomous bureaucracy. A statut général de la fonction publique 
ruling the bureaucratic roles and careers was established in 1946 granting recruitment by 
competitive exams, the freedom of opinion, the right to unionise, the right of trade unions to 
take part in career management and decisions regarding the organisation of services through 
joint consultative commissions (commissions paritaires). The civil service was then 
systematically divided into four groups (categories A, B, C, D) depending on the level of 
recruitment. Although the right to strike was not mentioned, it was derived from the 1946 
constitution and was recognised by the Council of State in 1950 (Meininger 2001). As 
analysed by Martin Shefter (1994, p. 58), this professionalization resulted from an alliance 
with lower-level officials and trade unions (specifically the CGT) and was negotiated by a top 
Gaullist politician and former top bureaucrat, Michel Debré, and the leader of the French 
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Communist party, Maurice Thorez then minister of the civil service (Siwek-Pouydesseau 
1989 ; Chevallier 1996). The „organizational‟ orientation of the French Civil Service was also 
institutionalised in 1945 with the creation of the Ecole nationale d’administration (ENA) as 
the centralised grande école for administrative state top bureaucrats (Kessler 1978). The ENA 
was aimed at socializing the members of different corps with the same ethos while also 
organizing, through the final ranking, their appointment to a specific corps and to a ministry, 
all functions largely persistent in the next decades (Eymeri 2001). Other training schools for 
civil servants (police, tax, justice, health) were created at the same period. In order to build a 
cohesive group of senior “interministerial” civil servants aimed at promoting cross-ministry 
links, another initiative created in 1945 a generic and interministerial grand corps of 
managers known as administrateurs civils supposedly acting as ministerial aides and 
occupying the top posts in the central administration of each ministry. These institutions 
finished to shape the French civil service, resulting in a hierarchical definition of office and 
career
3
, a weak number of later entry in the higher civil service and a twofold organization 
articulating a general statute for all to several specific rules for the various segments (corps) 
of the civil service organisation.  
 
 From 1946 to the early 2000s, this framework underwent no major changes except at 
the constitutional level. The principles established in 1946 remained in force during the 
beginning of the Fifth Republic even though they had to be adapted to the 1958 constitution 
which provided for a (new) separation between matters ruled by formal legislation and 
matters ruled by governmental regulations (Art. 34 and Art. 37 of the constitution); 
consequently, a new statute had to be published by the ordinance of 1959. In 1983–4, another 
statute was passed which reaffirmed the 1946 principles and extended them to local and 
hospital civil servants. Apart from this unification of the main principles (within those 
principles, a special legislation rules each branch of the civil service, and significant 
differences remain regarding recruitment and careers in local government), the 1983 statute 
widens civil servants‟ rights (for example civil servants can obtain leave in order to attend 
trade union training) (Meininger 2001). The reform was launched by the socialist and 
communist government as both an ideological claim from the Communist minister of the civil 
service and as a strategic electoral issue in conjunction with the 1982 decentralization policy. 
Indeed, the communists obtained the rationalisation and extension of the statute as a 
counterpart in exchange for political support of decentralisation policy (Bezes 2009, p. 217-
225): moderate decentralisation personnel transfers were gained against extension and 
rationalisation of the statut.  
 
The internal labour market  
 
The size, distribution and evolution of civil service 
 
Total employment in the French civil service amounted 5,2 million in 2006
4
. This 
included 2 524 440 for State civil service including teachers and military forces (fonction 
                                                 
3
 It is based on the notions of grade and corps, although the notion of „emploi‟/job exists in the French and the 
Spanish context, and opposed to the functional specialization based on the idea of job specification. 
4
 Ministère du budget des comptes publics et de la fonction publique (2008), Rapport annuel sur l’état de la 
fonction publique. Faits et chiffres 2007-2008, Paris, La documentation française, 645 p. Without further 
references the data discussed here are drawn from this document and date of reference is 31 December 2006.  
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publique d’Etat), 1 662 501 for local civil service (fonction publique territoriale) and 
1 014 142 for public hospitals (fonction publique hospitalière). If the definition of civil 
service is relatively clear, the boundaries of public employment can be discussed. Civil 
service administration suggests the number of 6,033 million including public enterprises 
(0,683), public organisations not included in civil service (0,172) and private organisations 
mostly financed by public money like private schools under contract (0,724). That is roughly 
one quarter of the total 25, 172 million employments in the country.  
The French civil service has undergone two main changes during the recent years. 
First a dramatic shift in employment conditions in public enterprises. Post and 
telecommunications, formerly ministerial Departments are now more and more independent 
and, since 1990, new recruitments are made on a contract basis. If former civil servants have 
seen the advantages of their statute maintained, some of the employees of France telecom 
have been forced to join the State public administration. For electricity, even if the employees 
are not public servants, employment conditions have remained stable. This could change with 
the gradual opening of the market. Even if employment in public enterprises has not been 
reduced, private standards have become widespread.  
 
Staff in civil service  
 State civil 
service 
Local civil 
services 
Publics 
hospitals 
Total Civil 
service 
Total 
employment 
France 
Civil 
service/ 
Total 
employment 
% 
1986 2 287 458 1 121 383 756 201  4 165 042 19,4  
1996 2 401 791 1 262 361 825 710  4 489 862 20,1  
2006 2 524 440 1 662 501 953 590  5 140 531 20,5 
Rapport annuel sur l‟état de la fonction publique 2007-2008 p. 272. 
 
The second change has been the steady growth of local civil service (Fonction publique 
territoriale). Since 1986, total employment in local government increased of about 50 % from 
1, 12 million in 1986 to 1,66 million in 2006. This has been due to successive devolution 
policies starting from 1983 with staff transfer from the State to local administrations. It has 
also been the consequence of the creation of new public entities such as supra-communal 
bodies. Finally the change has come as a result of the growing legitimacy of  local 
government.  
 
A third change, repeatedly announced by politicians, i.e. the downsizing of state 
administration, did not happen yet. Even with successive staff transfers to autonomous public 
enterprises and to local government, the size of state civil service grew until 2002 and remains 
steady since. In 2006, a slight inflexion occurred linked to the decision to replace only one 
state administration retiree over two. However, this downsizing policy has not been able to 
compete with the growth of employment in local government. In the 2008 Budget, and after 
arbitration, the suppression of 22 802 posts of state civil servants globally met the „one in 
two‟ target except for the Education5, the Higher Education and the Justice Ministries which 
were able to plead special presidential priority. On the other hand, the Defence (- 6037), The 
Finances (-2380) or the Interior Ministries sustained the most considerable losses. About 
                                                 
5
 Around 13 000 posts have been suppressed in the Education Ministry but this does not correspond to the 
objective of not replacing one retired civil servant in two.  
 10 
34 000 suppressions have been announced for the Budget 2010 affecting the Education, the 
Defence and the Finances ministries.  
 
The French Civil service is now divided into three categories according to level of 
recruitments level A (executives, teachers), B Middle level (graduates from secondary 
schools) and C lower levels (support administrative staff)
6
. The percentage of top level 
executives is higher in state administration (23,3 %) than in the private sector (14 %). In 
accordance with the new regulatory functions of the State, this share has increased. Teachers 
from elementary school to university are also members of category A. In the contrary, the 
lower levels have the largest share in local administration, which corresponds to the service 
functions of these organisations (refuse collection, maintenance staff for public space …) as 
well as patronage.  
 
 A 1996 A 2006 B 1996 B 2006 C 
1996 
C 
2006 
State civil service 38,5 48,1 30,8 26,5 30,7 25,4 
Civil , non teacher (state) 19,4 23,3 24,1 34,7 56,5 42,0 
Local civil service 7,8 8,7 12,9 13,8 79,3 77,5 
Public hospitals 14,9 15,6 36,7 35,8 48,4 48,6 
Rapport annuel sur l‟état de la fonction publique 2007-2008 p.51. 
 
Labour contracts 
 
The civil service is mainly made up of tenured civil servants. In the state administration, as 
illustrated in the historical part, they are member of “corps”. Incumbents of these professional 
bodies are equal in terms of their rights and duties, their careers and job possibilities 
according to the provisions of special statutes that rule them. The initial recruitment of civil 
servants is carried out through competitive examinations based mainly on academic 
credentials and knowledge. They may then follow internal training. In a career system, 
individuals are recruited not only for a position or a job but for a career. During the career 
life-time, civil servants climb the grades of their corps. In many corps, this promotion has 
been based more on seniority than on merit, however there are some exceptions (Jeannot, 
2005) In order to be promoted to another corps, a civil servant needs to pass an internal 
competitive exam. The large number of corps (up to 1500) used to be a traditional subject of 
irony. However the number has recently been dramatically reduced. By 2010 there will only 
remain 380 corps, and in fact 90 % of civil servants belong to one of 140 corps.  
 
Some employees of the public service are recruited under fixed-term contract: 296 000 in 
state administration, 346 000 in local government and 135 000 in hospitals. The fixed term 
contracts respond to needs for specific competences or are used tools in the quest for 
flexibility. In some cases (such as subsidized employment) it must be considered as the 
implementation of a social policy. In the state administration it represents 11,7 % of 
employment and 20,8 % in local administration. A good part of the contractual staff is 
concentrated around a few functions: education assistants helping teachers in schools, 
researchers or neighbourhood wardens. In state administration the fixed-term contracts mainly 
concern entertainment officers whereas liaison officers in local government. A longitudinal 
approach (study of the carriers of individuals entering the civil service on a given year) of 
external mobility shows that beyond  five years of employment, employees of state civil 
                                                 
6
 The category D was suppressed in 1990 and merged with the category C.  
 11 
services  do not leave their jobs  as some in fact have stable contracts and others secure their 
employment by passing internal exams in order  to enter a corps. Thus, a threefold distinction 
should be made between unstable agents, working for less than five years, stable agents under 
contract and tenured civil servants. (Bessière and Pouget, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
Salary system 
 
Basic salary depends on membership in a corps. Each corps has a salary grid. The hierarchy 
between the salary grids correspond to the hierarchy of the function, and is roughly the same 
in different ministerial departments. A clerk (category C) will be positioned at the same level 
in all the Departments (a monthly salary between 1400 and 1750 euros), an inspector of taxes 
or a controller of public buildings (category B) earns a monthly salary between 1400 and 2000 
euros; an engineer‟s or a teacher‟s (category A) monthly income goes up to 3500 euros and a 
top engineer, a university professor or a judge also earn more or less the same salary  (up to 
5000 euros). Equality and transparency are in theory the master words of this system but, in 
practice, inequality and non transparency are the rules, in particular through a specific bonus 
system specific to each ministerial Department.  
 
Salary supplements are related to ministerial Departments and their amount differs from one 
Department to the other. Education is at the lowest level (10 %), technical ministers 
(transport, agriculture, …) at a medium level (60 %) and Finance Department is at the top. 
The top level bonuses are quasi secret. The figures below, given by Department of civil 
service, intentionally merge together the bonus rates salaries of senior executives of the 
Department of finance and the other less favoured Departments. The real hierarchy is in fact 
different. A policeman earns as much as a teacher and a university professor makes much less 
than a judge or a top executive of the Finance Department.  
 
Annual salary of state civil servants (net in euros) bonus related to brut salary (%) 
 
 Net salary  Bonus percent 
Directorate managers 82 319 61 
Judges 57 548 50 
Engineers  57 604 60 
Military officers  42 977 57 
University professors 49 585 9 
Secondary school teachers 23 977 8 
Elementary school teachers 21 723  5 
Technician 25 951 31 
Clerks 19 469 23 
workers 16 804 16 
Policeman an Prison 22 887 40 
Soldier 17 690 23 
Total  26 641 22 
Rapport annuel sur l‟état de la fonction publique 2007-2008 p.528 
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Salary patterns in the whole differ between the public and private sectors. On the one hand, 
there is less pay diversity in the public sector. On the other hand, wages in the lower positions 
are higher in the public sector than in the private while lower in the higher positions. Lucifora 
and Meurs (2006) have observed that male executives in the public sector (non teachers) earn 
4% less that their counterparts in the private sector while it is 2% less for public female 
executives compared to private female executives . This difference is higher in Italy but does 
not exist in Great Britain.  
 
 
Real mobility 
 
Tenured civil servants, especially in State administration do not tend to leave to the private 
sector. However internal mobility is much higher inside the public service than it is in the 
private sector. We can distinguish geographic mobility (change of city and region), 
organisational mobility (lateral moves between organisations, changing ministerial 
Departments for example), and socio-professional mobility.  
 
Geographic mobility is stronger than in private sector. In 2006, 3,7 % of civil servants had 
changed place against 2,7 % in the private sector. This has been mostly young civil servants 
(especially teachers) who, for example, are forced to accept a first job in the suburbs around 
Paris and who try to return in their region and managers who work from one region to another 
in order to progress in their career.  
 
Nonetheless the road to organisational mobility is full of obstacles, especially that of mobility 
between Departments. If the personal management for a member of a specific corps is under 
the jurisdiction of a given Ministerial Department, then applying for a job in another specific 
Department implies complex procedures. Beyond these bureaucratic difficulties, there are also 
economic and social difficulties to overcome. Incumbent of the most favoured Departments 
are not willing to leave their place for newcomers from “poorer” ministerial Departments, 
and, more generally, will not offer the better promotions or positions to outsiders. 
 
As for socio professional mobility, a longitudinal approach (Bessière, Pouget, 2007) revealed 
that one out of two state civil servants who entered in the category B in 1983 was hired as a 
member of the category A ten years later. These promotions have been made possible through 
traditional internal exams (30% of recruitments in corps), structural reform (the elementary 
school teachers have progressively been recognised as category A), and use of external 
exams. This very strong mobility is due to two phenomena. On the one hand the growing need 
for higher qualifications due to new regulatory functions in the State. On the other hand, 
recruitment of overqualified civil servants, due to a high level of unemployment in the 
country. The civil servants who had originally accepted a job inferior to their academic level, 
took advantage of the new pattern of competencies to accelerate their carriers.  
 
Diversity 
 
Representative bureaucracy has only recently become a subject of debate in France. Three 
themes are presently under discussion: gender, class and ethnicity.  
 
There are more women in the civil service than in the private sector: 60,8 % of staff for state 
and local government against 44, 5 % in the private. For executives, one among two is a 
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woman in the public sector against one among three in the private sector
7
. Even in 
traditionally “male” professions (army, police, prison, technicians, etc.) the presence of 
women is growing. The bureaucratic and egalitarian system of corps offers good protection 
for women and the pay gap between the sexes is lower in the public than in the private 
sectors.  
 
However, there is no symmetry in public management between women and men in terms of 
opportunity and power. Women remain underrepresented in higher management. The share of 
women in different setting could be different. A good indicator of real opportunity is the 
comparison between the ratio women/men in a higher position and the ratio women/men in 
the population who has access to this specific position (often the member of a specific corps). 
If the ratio equals 1, we could consider that opportunities are equal. In fact this ratio never 
equals 1. In 2006 the ratio was 0,52 for directors of central administration, 0,34 for prefects 
(préfets) and 0,45 for medium level management positions. 
 
Civil service also offers good opportunities to people from the lower-income classes. 38,4 % 
of the children from blue-collar families who have entered civil service have become member 
of cadre or intermediary professions. The figure is only 25,5 % for those who opted for the 
private sector (Audier 2000). This could be linked to a diploma effect. With the equivalent 
degree, public servants have more modest origins in the public than in private sectors.  
 
Ethnicity remains a delicate subject in France. There are no ethnic statistics and one must use 
indirect question such as place of birth of parents to be able to examine the question. Even so, 
these data show at least a certain difficulty for the children of immigrants from the 1960s to 
enter public administration. The unemployment rate of individuals with two parents born 
abroad is twice as big as that of people with parents born in France. The children of 
immigrants represent 1% of staff in the private sector and 0,6 % in the public sector. The gap 
remains even after cross-control with diploma, age or father‟s profession (Pouget, 2005).  
 
Labour relations 
 
The civil service has a number of peculiarities regarding labour relations. These are 
essentially related to the weight and role of the state in French society. As the country‟s main 
employer, it adopts appropriate management rules and techniques in terms of recruitment, 
wages, training, promotion and career advancement. This feature also relates to its role as a 
public authority, mediator and defender of the general interest. Civil servants, at the service of 
the state, embody it as much as they represent it. They consequently become the vehicle of its 
prerogatives and hence an employee, unlike others, to whom a „special legal system, 
departing from the usual rules of labour legislation and determining a particular set of rights 
and obligations‟ applies. As a direct consequence of the significance of this status, the rules 
governing labour relations in the civil service are highly formalised, in the form of codified 
laws and regulations. 
 
The rate of trade union membership in the public sector is 20 percent compared to 10 percent 
in the private sector (Siwek-Pouydesseau 2001). This rate is not spread evenly, with 80 per 
cent in the police, 30 per cent in education, 25 per cent in finances and infrastructure and 15 
per cent in the hospital sector. Levels of conflict in the public sector are equally high, 
although available figures lack precision (Denis 2003). Mouriaux (2000, p. 160) has traced 
                                                 
7
 Source : enquête emploi en continu, INSEE. 
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this asymmetry between the public and private sectors back to 1986 when mobilisation started 
to weaken steadily in the private sector and simultaneously to increase in the public sector. 
Rouban (2004a) pinpoints the rise of conflict in the civil service to the autumn 1995 strike 
with an explosion of lost individual working days (3 760 000) in the public sector. Although 
this moment was quite specific, 683,584 individual working days were still lost in 1998, 
751,868 in 1999, 1,650,338 in 2000 and 1,115,331 in 2001. These conflicts, the result of a 
steep deterioration of the organisational climate in state services, are seen as being less and 
less generalised or imputable to a united trade union front. With more and more segmentation, 
it has been increasingly local and/or category-specific– a sign of the dislocation of work 
collectives. 
 
Labour relations are both well developed, due to the strong presence of trade unions and 
institutions representing employees, and limited, due the absence of collective bargaining in 
the sense of a process leading to a convention or agreement (Saglio 2003). In fact the 
arrangements mentioned above are simply consultative. Yet absence of collective bargaining 
does not imply absence of negotiation in the sense of dialogue. Since the 1920s, union 
representatives have regularly been received by successive governments and, since the 1980s, 
negotiation has spread to new fields. These include revision of the civil service scales with the 
Durafour protocol in 1990, on-going education in 1989, 1992 and 1996 and the gradual 
reduction of temporary employment in 1996 and 2000 (Rehfeldt and Vincent 2002). More 
precisely, it indicates that civil servants are bound to the state by a particular relationship of a 
regulatory rather than a contractual or conventional nature. This means that the institutions 
representing civil servants are simply consultative bodies and that agreements signed by the 
partners have a moral and political value, without being legally binding.  
 
In this context, „renovation‟ of negotiations appeared necessary in view of their „low 
efficiency‟ (Fournier 2002). Hence the white paper on labour negotiations in the civil service 
proposed two agendas. The first suggested change is devolution of collective bargaining. The 
official objective here is to link the locus of negotiation more closely to those of decision-
making. The second proposed change is the „renewal‟ of labour negotiations that first and 
foremost involves the re-establishment of bodies representing employees. Renewing it means 
allowing actors other than officially recognised unions to participate.  
 
Bercy agreements of finance Department (November 2008) pave the way to the reform. Trade 
unions are recognised along their weight in professional elections. Agreement could only be 
recognised if signed by trade unions representing a majority of staff.  
 
Politicization  
 
As suggested in the historical part of this chapter, mechanisms of politicization have 
been set up and developed in the French context from the early Nineteenth century under the 
Napoleonic period. However, for the vast majority of state civil servants then recruited 
through competitive exams and schools and promoted through rationalized mechanisms after 
1945, politicization at all levels via political control of appointments and careers gradually 
disappeared. Forms of politicization have persisted and have even been continuously and 
growingly used as structuring means for steering, producing loyalty and controlling 
administration in two domains: at higher level for top bureaucrats within the state through 
ministerial cabinets and discretionary appointments (political loyalty is there in balance with 
expertise and competences) and, at various levels, for the territorial civil service where the 
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system of recruitment and career is slightly different from the state civil service and where 
politicization has remained more structuring.   
The first main layer of this “politicization” process at the top can be found in 
recruitment to ministerial cabinets. From 1958 and 1962, the strengthening of the executive – 
the offices of both President of the Republic and Prime Minister – allowed the increasing use 
and institutionalization of these mechanisms that came to reflect both support for and loyalty 
to a minister as well as policy expertise (for an overview on the all period, Bezes and Le 
Lidec 2007). General data on ministerial cabinets shows a significant and ongoing increase in 
the total number of cabinet positions in ministries from less than 300 people in the early 
sixties, about 500 in the 1980s reaching an approximate 700 in the 2000s. In 2001, within the 
second Jospin government including 34 ministerial and state secretaries portfolios, the 
number significantly rose to 584 then to 685 under the third Raffarin government (39 
portfolios) in 2004 and to 664 people under the Villepin government in 2006 (for these 
figures, see Duport et al., 2007). In November 2008, members of ministerial cabinets reached 
an official total of 619 people under the Fillon Governement (Projet de Loi de Finances 2009, 
37 portfolios) to whom 45 members of the Presidential cabinet should be added.  
Top civil servants from the ENA have been massively employed in these politicized 
structured for several reasons. Ministerial cabinets are extremely powerful centres of 
decisions where public policies are shaped in interaction with central administrations – thus 
providing attractive positions to senior civil servants ready to serve the government of the day 
or experts in a specific sector. Serving in ministerial cabinets has also been a reliable path for 
career advancement as a means of reaching leading positions in central administrations or of 
obtaining public and private jobs as rewards – specifically for members of less prestigious 
„grands corps‟ such as administrateurs civils – would not obtain so quickly through usual 
career paths.  
However, a significant decline in the number of members of the three administrative 
grands corps (Inspection des Finances, Cour des Comptes, Conseil d’Etat) in ministerial 
cabinets has been observed from around 34 per cent between 1958 and 1972 to 16,6 per cent 
between 1984 and 1996 (Rouban 2004b), even reaching 10% in a recent survey covering five 
cabinets (Prime minister, Budget, Interior, Justice and Labour) in four moments (1990, 1996, 
1999, 2003) (Duport and al. 2007). On one hand, this has to be referred to the rising staffs and 
to the emergence of new functions in cabinets related to the still-growing professionalization 
of politics: specific political, opinion-polls and communication advisers have increased 
significantly since the nineties (Sawicki and Mathiot 1999) but also to the appearance of new 
staff in cabinets who are not civil servants any more but “either professionals or political party 
and association activists” supporting the government‟s action and called “political advisers” 
(Rouban 2007, 2009). On the other hand, top civil servants in cabinets from to the three 
administrative grands corps still monopolize the leading positions such as cabinet directors or 
co-directors. A significant change has also been identified by Luc Rouban (2007, p. 491-493), 
observing that „ministerial cabinet membership is likely to become a true professional 
occupation‟ as some top civil servants have been spending quite a long period of their whole 
public career in the 1990s and 2000s being members of different ministerial cabinets 
(although in governments sharing the same political orientations) at different periods as 
competent issue experts.  
 
A second crucial dimension of the French dynamics of politicization has been the full 
use of discretionary powers to appoint the top management positions in central 
administrations (about 185 directors) and even more political nominations (125 prefects, 158 
ambassadors) for which recruitment belongs to the President and the government, specifically 
negotiated with the Prime Minister during the power-sharing periods (Schrameck 2001). The 
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rate of turnover for the heads of ministerial divisions after a new election has significantly 
increased since the sixties (14%). Rouban reported that 33 division heads (out of 170) were 
replaced during the first year of the Jospin government in 1997/1998 while 47 were dismissed 
during the first year of the Raffarin government in 2002/2003 (Rouban 2007, p. 488-489). 
Under the Sarkozy Presidency and the Fillon Government, media have highlighted a new 
acceleration of the rate of the turnover but recent data are scarce. Three observations can be 
made on the recent period. First, the turnover of prefects, traditionally higher than other public 
positions, seems to have even significantly increased. The president of the Association of the 
prefectoral corps, prefect of the Ile-de-France, mentions in October 2009 that 90% of the 125 
regional and départemental prefects in territorial positions have been moved between 2007 
and 2009. In 2007, with the presidential election of Nicolas Sarkozy, a significant move to 
tighten intra- and interministerial control have been made by redrawing boundaries between 
ministries, significantly reducing the number of full ministers and, most of all, drastically 
merging directorates in central administrations but also regional and departemental state units 
within ministries. The explicit aim was to generate cutbacks but also to strengthen the 
integration and coherence of public policy and to increase administrative responsiveness via a 
new hierarchy (for the full argument, see Bezes and Le Lidec, 2010). This dynamics follows a 
first move, initiated in 2004 with the creation of General Secretariats in all ministries, directly 
responsible to the Minister, with management authority over all departments and responsible 
for modernization and reorganization. This reshaped organization is likely to reinforce 
politicization as the reduction in the number of central and regional administrative 
directorates actually creates “super senior civil servants” with strategic and political 
orientations who enjoy more direct and loyal relationships, not only with their own minister, 
but also with the Head of State to whom they report (Bezes and Le Lidec, 2010).  
 
Another robust mechanism of politicization in the French context has been the limited 
but growing number of senior officials following political careers and seeking for electoral 
office. Twelve prime ministers out of eighteen were members of grands corps
8
 while fourteen 
came from the civil service. Only two out of twelve right-wing Prime ministers (Barre and 
Raffarin) were not members of higher civil service. Since the early 1990s, the number of  
ENA graduates being ministers declined as only 24 per cent of ministers under Balladur in 
1993 and Juppé in 1995/1996 were énarques (Kesler 1997) but key ministers  -- Foreign 
Affairs, Defence, Economy and Finances -- were often énarques (Chevallier 1997). In the 
recent Fillon government, this number has drastically dropped: out of 15 ministers in June 
2007, only one is a top civil servant and énarque. Out of 15 state secretaries (secrétaires 
d‟Etat), two came from the ENA and one from the school of Polytechnique and the corps of 
civil engineers. However, the most recent trajectory for civil servants seeking political careers 
appear to move to elective office via parliament or, even more now, local governments. As an 
example, in 2003, out of the twenty-two presidents of French metropolitan régions, nine were 
top civil servants out of which four were members of grands corps.  
At last, the local civil service (gathering 1 748 378 agents in 2007) has been 
historically built on rather distinct tracks, offering a mix between selective exams and high 
level of politicization for top management positions (Roubieu 1994) and for street-level 
agents and clerks for whom forms of patronage have been observed (Biland 2008). 
Politicization of senior management positions (a bit more than 3000 positions) in Regional 
and Départemental Councils and in big cities (more than 80 000 inhabitants) has been fully 
institutionalised and functions as a spoil system with various forms of political loyalty and 
                                                 
8 Four from the Conseil d’Etat (Debré, Pompidou, Fabius, Balladur), one from the Cour des Comptes (Chirac), four from 
Inspection des Finances (Couve de Murville, Chaban-Delmas, Rocard and Juppé) and three were diplomats (Messmer, 
Jospin, de Villepin).  
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systematic replacements when local executives change after elections (Perrin, 2007). This 
movement has been even intensified at lower top management levels in the 2000s including 
now assistant general directors of administrative services in local authorities (ibid.).  
 
There is no surprise that these various mechanisms of politicization result in increasing 
forms of “strategic politicization” (Rouban 2004c) or “functionally politicized” involvements 
among top civil servants (Eymeri 2003 ; Bezes and Le Lidec 2007, pp. 133-139; Rouban 
2009) characterised by strategic overview of a specific policy, stronger commitments to the 
objectives, political choices and results of this policy and personal loyalty to the minister in 
charge. Of course, this political commitment should be understood carefully as top civil 
servants have always claimed, from the early Fifth Republic to the recent period, to hold 
technical and professional competences and to form a new „modernizing‟ administrative elite 
(Dulong 1997; Gaïti 1998). However, recent scholars analysing the roles played by top 
bureaucrats suggest that the form of their involvements have evolved from “conviction and 
neutral expertise” to i/ stronger influence in the design of goals and strategic instruments in 
policies (for neo-liberal economic policy, Cameron 1995 ; for health policies, see Geniyes, 
Smyrl 2008 ; for state reforms, Bezes 2007, 2009) and to ii/ higher political responsiveness to 
the political minister they serve in cabinet or in senior management positions in central 
administrations. It is, for instance, highly significant that, under the new Sarkozy presidency, 
several prefects, members of the most reactive grands corps to political inputs, have been 
appointed in the presidential entourage or in strategic positions in ministries (Bezes, Le Lidec, 
2010).  
 
Recent Trends in Civil Service Reforms (1980s-2009…) 
 
Like in other European countries, several policies of administrative reforms were 
launched in the eighties and nineties in France (Bezes 2009). Although the reforms did not 
dominantly targeted the civil service per se, they started operating smooth departures from the 
historical institutional arrangements. Three distinct dynamics can be identified. The first one, 
continuously implemented by the Budget Division in the eighties and nineties, relied on 
cutback management policies on civil servants‟ wages and staff through depoliticized and 
low-profile techniques : they limited civil servants‟ wage growth and their purchasing power 
without public claims (Bezes 2007). The second dynamics, dominantly defended by left-wing 
governments from 1984 to 1991, developed a „modernization‟ narrative of administrative 
reform proposing a „public service oriented‟ programme emphasizing greater users‟ concerns, 
policy evaluation, experimentations of managerial tools (quality circles, managerial contracts) 
but also efforts towards better human resources management, vocational training and social 
dialogue with civil service trade unions. This narrative did not contain any bashing of 
bureaucrats neither challenged their legal protection. The „Public Service Renewal‟ 
programme, launched in 1989 by the Prime minister Michel Rocard, nicely illustrated the 
trade-off between the gradual introduction of managerial instruments and the participation of 
public agents to administrative reforms. The third dynamics took place in the 1990s. 
Defended by right wing governments, the narrative offered a „state reform‟ programme with 
strong New Public Management orientations and systematic announcements of the need to 
reshape the French administrative system in all its components (Bezes 2001). Dominant ideas 
in major public reports or in the Prime minister‟s plan (Juppé circular of the 26 July 1995) 
contained a comprehensive planning of administrative reorganizations through various 
measures: separation of steering functions from operational ones, restructuring of central 
administrations, devolution to state field units and their reorganisation under the prefect's 
leadership, clarification of competences between state and local authorities. Last but not least, 
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reform plans also emphasized the systematic use of managerial techniques, an important 
reform of the budgetary procedure and some proposals for reforming the French civil service: 
the reduction of the number of corps, a more flexible pay or a reform of senior executives' 
career. Major ministerial players (the Civil Service Ministry, the Finance Ministry‟s Budget 
Department, the Interior Ministry) simultaneously invested time and resources in pursuing 
some of these distinct measures but with rival interests and conceptions. From this, resulted 
significant moves towards more drastic evolutions of the state territorial organization, the 
budgeting process or human resources management but these ideas were to be developed and 
adopted more drastically after 2000 (Bezes, 2007).  
 
Indeed, by the early 2000s, several structuring features of the French civil service became 
more systematically object of critics and of reform proposals in a new context. The global 
issue became more acute in 2000 when the General Planning Commission made public the 
forecast that 45% of state public agents would be retired by 2012. Reducing the numbers of 
civil servants to this extent required the setting up of a genuine human resource policy, which 
had proved difficult to implement in the past due to the fragmentation of corps and the major 
role played by civil service trade unions as veto players. The career-based system, the corps 
system and the school-based orientation of the French civil service have been then growingly 
challenged. The buzzword of the reform dynamics has been the notion of “métier” which is, 
in English, a combination of craftsmanship and professionalism. The success of this trend 
must be related to the transformation and the slow weakening of the corporatist phenomenon 
in France (Jeannot 2005). Historically speaking, each civil service corps was related to a 
specific professional academic institution and gathered groups of civil servants with similar 
training and professional specialisation. Corps were regulated and self-managed, with 
variations between them, through peer control (for example, road engineers). However, 
gradually, civil service corps lost their links to one specific professional activity: the most 
prestigious corps, for instance, have become more and more generalist, encompassing a 
variety of occupations and positions. Belonging to a Corps has thus become a formal status, 
opening and facilitating rights for individual members. When speaking of “métier”, we, in 
fact, once again refer to and go back to professional competences and their specific skills. 
Many of the on going reforms and initiatives now impacting the French civil service are in 
line with this approach of “métier”. Some are limited in scope and incremental; others are 
more ambitious but they all tend to dilute the corps and make career, income and salaries 
more depending on the position/post held. Five new trends, with diverse origins that cannot be 
reduced to the diffusion of the new public management model, can be identified, generating 
changes in the French civil service (for a detailed argument in French, Jeannot 2008). All 
these transformative processes, effective or planned, tend to draw the public sector closer to 
the private sector. If the direction of the dynamics of change is clear, its scale still remains 
under questions.  
 
While an initial competitive exam based on academic and abstract knowledge remains 
the rule for hiring civil servants, some exceptions have been emerging. This appears at both 
ends of the hierarchy with the suppression of the final academic ranking in all civil service 
schools and specifically at the Ecole nationale d’administration (ENA), to be implemented by 
2012, and with a new global tool redefining the various routes to have access to careers in the 
three segmented French civil services (state, local authorities and hospitals), named “Parcours 
d‟accès aux carrières de la fonction publique territoriale hospitalière et d‟Etat” (PACTE). 
Historically, the ENA has paved the way for different administrative prestigious corps. Prior 
to 2008, access to these (more or less) prestigious “corps” was determined by highly 
competitive academic results within the school and by a final ranking at the end of the 
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instruction which allowed the students to choose their corps according to their results. By 
2012, the incumbents will have to apply for different positions and will be judged by their 
future employers (grands corps and their related institutions such as the Inspection générale 
des finances, the Conseil d’Etat or the Cour des Comptes ; ministries for the corps of 
„administrateurs civils‟). The PACTE recruitments, created in 2006, only affect category C 
personnel. It is aimed at recruiting people without academic diplomas on the basis of their 
practical skills. Beneficiaries are recruited without competitive exam on a contract basis. 
During one or two years, they have access to a mixture of training and professional practice. 
At the end of this period, they may be recruited as tenured civil servants on the basis of their 
practical competences. More generally, internal exams for promotion have now tended to be 
based on practical rather than academic performance. New laws concerning accreditation for 
work experience that can count towards a qualification (Validation des acquis de l’expérience, 
VAE) have also been applied in the public sector.  
Professional qualification and achievement have also been gradually acknowledged. 
All ministerial Departments have established competency grids, which could be used to 
announce the requirements of a position or to adjust progressively human resources to new 
missions. In certain cases, promotion is no longer linked to seniority but to the competency to 
manage teams or complex projects. This is the case for police superintendents or engineers. A 
new kind of bonus, “nouvelle bonification indiciaire”, allows now paying a higher salary to 
employees working in certain positions, especially top level managers. This is concomitant 
with the growing number of top level positions with specific salary status (named „Emplois 
fonctionnels‟). By 2010, a new single bonus, related to positions and performance, should be 
set up in the French civil service replacing all pre-existing bonus. This reform has forced all 
ministries to establish a quotation of all occupational positions. The „position part„ will 
constitute 50% of the bonus (between 10 and 20 % of the salary) and will be directly related 
to the fulfilled function and, in most of the cases, to the position in the hierarchy. Hence, 
salary levels tend, at least for the higher levels, to be based more on the position rather than 
on the corps.  
A 2003 report by the Conseil d’Etat (Conseil d‟Etat 2003) has even proposed to 
replace the corps by much larger groups of employees (between 30 and 50) called „cadres 
statutaires‟ (statutory frames). This framework is inspired by the French local civil service 
model. In this model, the workforce is both organised on activity sector (such as 
administration, environment, leisure, etc.) and on the hierarchy. The crossing of an activity 
sector and a hierarchical level defines a group of employees. The reform project is not only 
aimed at simplifying careers and facilitating mobility but also conceals a more ambitious 
project: destabilizing trade union corporatism according to the following sociological 
reasoning. Since decisions concerning individuals are taken inside the corps institutions (for 
example through the activities of the joint administrative committees, the CAP), several trade 
unions have developed exclusive sections, only open to members of a given corps. These 
trade unions tend, consequently, to defend the peculiarities and the members of a given corps. 
In this context, any change in the size of the corps will destabilize this corporatist structuring. 
Whether the full 2003 reform project will actually be applied by the state or not remains 
uncertain. Nevertheless, the significant and steady reduction in the number of corps through 
mergers (see supra) or the creation of new inter-corps decision-making modalities could lead 
to the same results.  
The European Union has a discrete yet real influence on French civil service reform 
through different paths. The first is related to the obligation to conform to the rules of free 
circulation of workers. Although very few citizens of other European countries have in fact 
sought to enter French civil service, necessary provisions to keep open this possibility have 
lead to substantial changes in doctrine. A case law concerning a Portuguese hospital director 
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willing to manage a French hospital has lead to allowing the person to enter the corps of 
hospital manager without obtaining the diploma issued by the corresponding higher education 
school. The fact that these rules don‟t apply to positions linked to the exercise of 
"sovereignty" (named "prerogatives of the state"), tend to give weight to a German distinction 
between Beamte and Angestellte and to confine the status of public servant only to functions 
such as police or justice. The idea of private contract has even been suggested in a recent 
official report (Silicani 2008). Second, social agreements brokered at a European level apply 
to civil services as well as the private sector. This is specifically the case for limitation of 
working hours and rules hindering successive fixed-terms contracts. The civil service 
regulation has had to change in order to integrate these European constraints, initially 
designed to protect workers from the private sector. Third, more indirectly, European open 
competition policy has lead to major changes in the human resources management of public 
enterprises. This mode of management has created a very influential model for civil service 
reform. In particular, these public enterprises (France Telecom, the Post office) have 
conducted reengineering processes, which have suggested tactical ways of reforming human 
resource management. These strategies seem to have inspired the large scale reengineering 
plan of the French administration, launched by the Fillon government since July 2007 and 
called „révision générale des politiques publiques‟ (general public policy review) with explicit 
reference to the Canadian Program Review (1995-1996) or the UK spending reviews (2002). 
Within a broad package of decisions, a systematic reorganisation of the territorial state has 
now been launched through mergers of state field units creating large ministerial services at 
the regional level and big inter-ministerial units at the départemental one. This very ambitious 
reform is to generate many problems of human resources management in terms of mobility, 
career pattern, salary grid, etc. The ongoing movement of merging structures should also 
favour an intensification of the merger of corps in order to facilitate inter-ministerial mobility. 
In this perspective, a law on mobility was voted on the 3 August 2009 making available 
provisions to facilitate such reorganisations. The law creates opportunities for interim work 
and gives human resources managers the power to force civil servants to change jobs. In case 
of reorganisation, a civil servant could be fired after declining three proposed alternative jobs.  
New public management theories have long been less influential in France than in 
other European countries (Bezes, 2009). Nevertheless, some ideas have found their way, 
especially through a major budget reform voted the 1 August 2001 and implemented since 
2006. With the implementation of the Organic Act on Budget Legislation (loi organique 
relative aux lois de finances) named “LOLF”, performance measurement has become central 
to state regulation. The Law involves a major change in the procedures and contents of 
budget, moving away from line-item budgeting towards public policy and performance 
sensitive frames. All state activities have been framed in (34) missions and (132) programs, 
each program with targets and performance indicators. Performance measurement has 
consequently become central in the relation between the Administration and the Parliament 
but also between the Budget Directorate and ministries. The new budgetary and managerial 
framework has been provoking many cascading effects. By offering the (theoretical) 
possibility for managers in the state field services to make autonomous budgetary choices 
between appropriations, the reform has paved the way for more devolution in personnel 
policies so that state field service might develop their own Human Resources Management 
policies at local level via a strengthening of autonomy and flexibility. Pay-for-performance 
plans and more differentiated career structures could appear as a logical consequence in the 
personnel policy of the new managerial approach. However, reforms aimed at improving 
incentives and especially pay-for-performance plans appeared only recently and have not yet 
proven to be really pervasive. Experiments have been carried out in the Departments of 
Finance, Justice and the Police in 2006. A careful examination of these practices shows that 
 21 
specific difficulties have arisen. In many situations, managers are reluctant to differentiate 
between agents. Sometimes the bonuses are in fact used to reinforce the hierarchy between the 
positions. Even the proponents of this doctrine consider performance bonus more as a 
pedagogic tool to accompany the LOLF rather than a real incentive system.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
Since the early 2000s, the French civil service has been increasingly and 
unprecedentedly affected by two dynamics of reform. The first transformative movement has 
resulted from the indirect effects of the managerial reform of the Budget procedure (the LOLF 
voted in 2001 and implemented from 2006) and of the on-going reorganization of the 
territorial state through mergers, launched in 2008 within the General Review of Public 
Policy. None of these reforms directly targeted the civil service but both contained „hidden 
agendas‟ via the introduction of low-profile tools aimed at provoking destabilizing effects on 
the civil service and at favouring significant departures from its historical structures. The 
LOLF has paved the way for more devolution, performance-oriented instruments and cutback 
management on personnel expenditure, through the use of „frame-budgeting‟ and broad 
aggregated heading allowing more flexible reallocation of appropriations. The current 
mergers of state units at regional and départemental level are also aimed at producing many 
cascading effects on the civil service. These reorganizations are to modify career patterns by 
reducing the number of central and regional administrative directorates within the state and by 
constraining many state civil servants at local level to join a new merged organisation and to 
rebuild their mobility plans. These reorganizations will result in significant reallocation of 
human resources. Inter-ministerial mobility should be then strongly encouraged in this context 
and there is no doubt that there will be increasing pressures for adopting inter-ministerial 
statutory frames, much larger than corps and corresponding to the large merged structures.  
However, these reforms also put great emphasis on limits to mobility within the 
existing French civil service. Differences in salaries and bonus between existing corps or 
economic difficulties to move for civil servants from categories B and C are real issues to be 
tackled. In this direction, the second transformative dynamics corresponds to more direct 
attempts at reforming the historical features of the French civil service. As analysed in this 
chapter, there is much evidence that these components have now been directly challenged by 
European and inner-state pressures and by a large number of initiatives: mergers of corps, the 
introduction of performance-related pay measures, more emphasis on mobility, interim and 
fixed term contracts and smooth attempts at bringing together the model of the state civil 
service status near the local civil service model. Whether the „grands corps‟ will resist these 
new trends is still open to discussion.  
At this stage, the future of the French civil service is still uncertain, as there is no 
single model at the heart of these reforms but several possibly contradictory trends (private 
sector, New Public Management, local public service, public enterprises, etc.). However, 
ongoing changes are unprecedented and would have to be evaluated according to two main 
dimensions. The first is the transformation of the French historical civil service model, 
specifically the strength of the corporatist phenomenon and the importance of its socializing 
values. The second suggests considering the differentiated impacts of reforms according to 
civil servants‟ positions in the hierarchy, and the possible risk of a dualisation of the 
administrative labour market.  
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